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Deracialization or Racialization: The Making of 
a Black Mayor in Jackson, Mississippi1
Byron D’Andra Orey
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
In 1997, Harvey Johnson made history by becoming the first black to 
be elected as mayor of Jackson, Mississippi. Four years prior, John-
son failed to make the Democratic primary runoffs. The following re-
search question is addressed: what explains Johnson’s victory in 1997, 
when compared to his defeat in 1993? In answering this question, I 
rely heavily on elite-level interviewing and newspaper accounts. I also 
examine the black and white vote for Johnson, using aggregate-level 
election and census data. Gary King’s Ecological Inference technique 
is used to examine these data. Based on the findings, I conclude that 
Johnson ran a deracialized campaign in 1993 and a racialized cam-
paign in 1997. The deracialized campaign failed to attract white voters 
and attenuated his black support. In 1997, however, he was able to al-
most double his support from black voters. This increase can be attrib-
uted in part to his racialized campaign strategy. 
Lord have mercy! We’re going to have a black mayor in Jackson, 
Mississippi. 
—An anonymous black woman quoted in Chappell (1997, 76) 
On May 3, 2005, Harvey Johnson was soundly defeated in the Demo-
cratic primary for mayor of Jackson, Mississippi, thereby ending his eight-
year tenure as mayor of that city. In 1997 Johnson made history by becom-
ing the city’s first African-American mayor. Johnson’s victory is of par-
ticular interest, given Jackson’s infamous history in the area of race rela-
tions. As the capital of Mississippi, Jackson is well known for its massive 
resistance to civil rights. Indeed, the above epigraph expresses the shock 
felt within the black community upon Johnson’s election. 
Four years prior to Johnson’s victory, he was defeated in the Democrat-
ic primary for that same office. One of the questions posed in the current re-
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search is what produced the difference between Johnson’s victory in 1997 
and his defeat in 1993 in this majority black city?2 One potential answer is 
rendered by the subtitle of an article in Jackson’s major newspaper, The Clar-
ion Ledger, on the day after Johnson’s victory in the Democratic primary in 
1997. It read, “[n]ew approach wins race for Johnson” (Stringfellow 1997, 
1A). Implied in this “new approach” is the notion that Johnson ran a dera-
cialized (or race-neutral) campaign in 1993 and lost, then ran a racialized (or 
race-specific) campaign in 1997 and won. The article specifically suggests 
that Johnson’s (1997) campaign was similar to the one Harold Washington 
ran in the 1983 Chicago mayoral election, an election categorized by many 
scholars as a racialized campaign (see e.g., Albritton et al. 1996). My prima-
ry purpose in this article is to compare and contrast the 1993 and 1997 cam-
paigns run by Johnson, to test whether his newly adopted campaign strategy 
served as the impetus behind his victory in 1997. In the following sections, I 
examine the extant literature on the topic of deracialization and race-specific 
campaigns, discuss the data and methods employed, summarize the findings, 
and consider what these findings imply about the use of deracialized or ra-
cialized campaigns in the area of black politics. 
Deracialized or Racialized Campaign Strategies?
On November 7, 1989, L. Douglas Wilder (Virginia), David Dinkins 
(New York, New York), Norman Rice (Seattle, Washington), and John Dan-
iels (New Haven, Connecticut) all made history by becoming the first black 
to be elected as chief executive of their respective political jurisdictions 
(Perry 1990). During that same year, a total of eight African Americans were 
elected as mayors of major American cities and one was elected as gover-
nor. The success achieved by these candidates led McCormick (1989) to la-
bel this day “black Tuesday.” According to Perry (1990), of the nine candi-
dates elected, four ran deracialized campaigns. Deracialized campaigns are 
typically run in majority white jurisdictions, whereby minority candidates 
minimize the use of race in an effort to attract white electoral support. 
McCormick and Jones (1993) provide a definition of deracialization to 
denote situations in which black candidates, in particular, avoid using any 
“explicit reference to race-specific issues, while at the same time empha-
sizing those issues that are perceived as racially transcendent” (76). Addi-
tionally, these authors state that a deracialized political strategy affects the 
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issues candidates stress, their mobilization tactics, and the style of their 
campaigns (McCormick and Jones 1993). When running a deracialized 
campaign, black candidates, they argue, should avoid using explicit refer-
ences to issues such as welfare, affirmative action, and set-asides. Rather, 
they should place emphasis on issues that appear to be race-neutral. The 
second aspect of a deracialized strategy involves the campaign tactics em-
ployed by black candidates to mobilize voters. The authors contend that 
black office seekers should avoid public appeals to the black communi-
ty. In addition, black candidates do not want to give whites the impression 
that they are only interested in representing blacks. The final component 
emphasized by the authors is political style. The success of black candi-
dates in attracting white support depends in part on their ability to proj-
ect a nonthreatening image. It is therefore necessary for black candidates 
to project a reassuring image to the white electorate. Black candidates, for 
example, should avoid associating themselves with people that white vot-
ers will view as racial partisans. 
A race-specific campaign, in contrast, is defined as one in which “one 
candidate calls attention to the race of his or her opponent or opponent’s 
supporters or if the news media covering a campaign disproportionately 
call attention to the race of one candidate or of that candidate’s supporters” 
(Paul Luebke cited in Grofman, Handley, and Niemi 1992, 107-8). Indeed, 
Reeves (1997, 21) points out, “campaign appeals that heighten the salience 
of race are injected into election contests not exclusively by political candi-
dates and their operatives but by news media organizations as well.” 
The Evolution of the Deracialization Concept 
Charles Hamilton first introduced the concept “deracialization” 
in 1973 at a National Urban League meeting. The purpose of the meet-
ing was to have a group of scholars, activists, and public officials dis-
cuss strategies for the organization in the “post-protest” phase of the civ-
il rights movement. During this meeting Hamilton presented a brief es-
say that addressed some of these possible strategies. He suggested that an 
effort should be made to gain strategic support from those outside of the 
black community, especially from whites (Hamilton 1973). In an effort to 
gain white support, Hamilton indicated that blacks should address social 
issues that appeal to society as a whole. For Hamilton, one such issue was 
“full employment,” which he considered the most important issue facing 
the black community and also an issue that might appeal to whites. Ham-
ilton labeled this strategy as a “deracialized” approach that would gain 
white support. 
In 1976, Hamilton again addressed the concept of deracialization. 
This time, in a position paper commissioned by the Democratic Party, he 
advised presidential candidates to emphasize issues that would have an 
appeal across racial lines (Hamilton 1977). Arguing that programs target-
ed directly to minorities lose votes, he urged civil rights groups and the 
Democratic Party to work for “deracialized solutions” such as national 
health insurance and an income maintenance program (McCormick and 
Jones 1993, 70). William Julius Wilson (1990) expanded upon Hamil-
ton’s message by suggesting that the Democratic Party embrace a progres-
sive “race neutral program.” Wilson stated that blacks and liberals who 
have pushed “a race-specific agenda” (e.g., affirmative action, minority 
set-asides, busing) create a major barrier to those advocating broader pro-
grams that would be more attractive to white voters. 
In their application of the deracialization concept, two local observ-
ers of L. Douglas Wilder’s 1989 Virginia gubernatorial campaign, Charles 
Jones and Michael Clemons, note that Wilder presented himself as a “so-
cial moderate and fiscal conservative who represented the ‘New Virginia 
Mainstream’—a major theme of the campaign” (Jones and Clemons 1993, 
140). An investigation of Wilder’s appointment book disclosed that be-
tween June 19 and September 4, 1989, Wilder appeared before the public 
84 times. Jones and Clemons identify the groups Wilder addressed as be-
ing predominantly white or predominantly black and report that only ten 
of these appearances were before black audiences. 
Schexnider (1990) contends that Wilder’s deracialization strategy can 
be traced back as far as his 1985 campaign to become lieutenant governor 
of Virginia. In Schexnider’s view, Wilder did not present himself to the 
Virginia electorate as a black candidate in 1985. Based on the author’s ac-
count, Wilder focused on his legislative record, and economic, education-
al, and environmental issues that appealed to all voters (Schexnider 1990, 
155). Schexnider points to the work of Yancey (1988) as support for his 
claims. He quotes Yancey as stating that 
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Wilder never mentioned race. He hammered away at why he 
was more qualified until the media and white voters finally 
had to pay attention. But his campaign never took on the 
aura of a black crusade. But Wilder knew he had to have 
the redneck and suburban vote to win and he went after it 
(Yancey 1988, quoted in Schexnider 1990, 155). 
In 1983, Wilson Goode was elected as the first black mayor of Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania. According to Ransom (1987), Goode achieved this 
feat by not running as a black candidate. “Goode did not portray himself 
as a ‘black’ candidate for mayor; instead, he campaigned as the former 
city managing director—he was familiar with city services; he knew the 
budget; he had demonstrated his managerial skills; and he had a vision 
of Philadelphia on the move” (276). Ransom goes on to state that Goode 
placed emphasis on his experience and background, and voiced the neces-
sity of a partnership between the public and private sectors, but failed to 
reference any evidence to support these claims. 
Deracialization and Its Limitations as a Campaign Strategy 
The deracialization strategy gained increased attention following the 
success of black candidates on “black Tuesday.” The strategy, however, 
has not always ended in success. While Andrew Young was successful as 
an Atlanta mayor in using a deracialized strategy to build a coalition be-
tween the white business-elites and the black middle-class, this strategy 
failed to mobilize support from either blacks or whites in his 1990 bid for 
governor. 
Why was Young unable to mobilize the black vote? According to Pier-
annunzi and Hutcheson (1996), many of Young’s previous black support-
ers were dissatisfied with his tenure as mayor. During Young’s campaign 
for governor he was highly criticized by homeless advocates for his dis-
placement of mainly black residents during the construction of an Olympic 
stadium (98). Black ministers and black-elected officials criticized him for 
his ties to the business elites (99). Young maintained his connections with 
the business elites during the governor’s race by seeking campaign con-
tributions from major corporations such as Delta Airlines and Coca-Cola. 
In seeking these donations, as well as his efforts to appeal to white vot-
ers, Pierannunzi and Hutcheson (1996) suggest that Young ran a deracial-
ized campaign. In one instance, he mentioned that racism in Georgia was 
once like “cancer” but was now like “acne.” His successful white oppo-
nent, Zell Miller, rebutted by claiming that racism was increasing. Despite 
the lack of emphasis on race by Young, he was able to garner only 15 per-
cent of the white vote. More important, voter turnout of whites was report-
edly higher than anticipated and the black turnout was very low (although 
Pierannunzi and Hutcheson 1996, 100 fail to provide any figures for vot-
er turnout). In short, Young appeared to have lost more than he gained by 
running a deracialized campaign. He failed to mobilize his much needed 
black support and also failed to capture a significant amount of the white 
vote. This was blamed largely on his deracialized campaign strategy (Pier-
annunzi and Hutcheson 1996).3 
Race-Specific Campaigns 
Pohlman and Kirby (1996, xxi) contend that candidates who make de-
racialized appeals are seen by blacks as naive at best or as “selling out at 
worst.” These authors conclude that the election of Dr. Willie Herenton as 
mayor of Memphis, Tennessee in 1991 is inconsistent with the notion that 
a black candidate should run a deracialized campaign if s/he is to be suc-
cessful in a racially competitive jurisdiction. Memphis serves as an inter-
esting case given the racial makeup of the city. As of 1990, blacks consti-
tuted 54 percent of the total population and 51 percent of the voting age 
population. The authors document previous failed attempts by black can-
didates in Memphis who allegedly ran deracialized mayoral campaigns 
(Pohlman and Kirby 1996, 23-4, 94; see also Wright 1996, 152-4). As a 
result of these failed attempts, the authors maintain, Herenton relied pri-
marily on the mobilization of black support in his successful bid for may-
or. Herenton’s almost exclusive dependency on the black electorate was 
due to the absence of a liberal white community located in Memphis. Ac-
cording to Pohlman and Kirby (1996, 200), “political reality severely lim-
ited the chances of deracialized city politics, at least at the mayoral level.” 
The failure of the deracialized campaigns by previous candidates in 
Memphis makes that case very similar to that of Jackson studied here. 
While Herenton was able to learn from the previous mistakes of other 
mayoral candidates, Harvey Johnson may have learned from his own pre-
vious mistakes in 1993 as he emerged as the first black mayor of Jack-
son in 1997 (although see Coleman and Hudson 2001). According to the 
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United States Census, as of 1990, the population of Jackson was 56 per-
cent black and its voting age population was 51 percent black. The black 
population in Jackson is very similar to that of Memphis. Also, as was 
the case in Memphis, racially polarized voting has been documented to 
exist in Jackson (see Parker 1990, 136-42). 
One of the most well-known race-specific campaigns was that con-
ducted by Harold Washington for mayor of Chicago in 1983 (Albritton et 
al. 1996). Grimshaw (1992) argues that Washington established a broad 
base in the black church, the black community’s historic institution of 
protest.4 When Washington entered the 1983 mayoral campaign, he relied 
heavily on the firm moral base in the black church, and a solid political 
organization in the black wards. 
Glaser (1996) provides evidence that Mississippi Congressman Ben-
nie Thompson also was successful in running a racialized campaign. Gla-
ser states that “Bennie Thompson ran an unapologetic racial campaign ori-
ented toward blacks and virtually ignored the white minority (169).” Gla-
ser cites an increased black population in the district and the low white 
vote received by black former Congressman Mike Espy in his first elec-
tion as reasons for Thompson’s strategy (16).5 
Data and Methods
This article relies on both quantitative and qualitative methods. Data 
employed are derived from personal interviews, campaign materials, 
print media, 1990 U.S. Census data, and election returns related to the 
1993 and 1997 Democratic primaries for the office of mayor in Jackson, 
Mississippi. Information regarding the campaigns run by Harvey Johnson 
was gathered through elite-level interviews with political observers (e.g., 
political scientists and newspaper reporters) and people who worked in 
Harvey Johnson’s campaign. 
The quantitative analysis incorporated in the current research ex-
amines the estimated white and black support for Johnson. Precinct-lev-
el election returns and the racial composition of the voting age popula-
tion of precincts are employed to determine whether Johnson received 
an increase or a decrease in his black and white support between the 
1993 and the 1997 elections. It is argued here that a deracialized cam-
paign in 1993 may have limited Johnson’s black support without pro-
ducing much white support, while a race-specific campaign in 1997 may 
have strengthened his black support sufficiently to win. The election re-
turns were collected from the city clerk’s office in Jackson and the racial 
compositions of the voting age populations in the various precincts were 
collected from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The levels of black and 
white voter support for Johnson are estimated using Gary King’s method 
of ecological inference (King 1997). This method is based on modeling 
random parameters for each precinct within the city (see e.g., Palmquist 
and Voss 1997).6 
All of the quantitative data are aggregate-level data and are collect-
ed at the precinct level. Unfortunately, reliable individual-level data are 
not available for this analysis. The general problem of moving from data 
on aggregated tabulation units to data on individuals is known as the prob-
lem of ecological inference. Given the use of aggregate-level data, we 
must acknowledge that we are confronting the “ecological fallacy”—the 
possibility of making false inferences about individuals from aggregate 
data. Gary King (1997, 94),7 however, has proposed a method designed to 
specifically “correct for aggregation bias,” thereby reducing the potential 
of falling prey to the ecological fallacy. King’s method expands upon the 
Duncan-Davis method of bounds and incorporates the deterministic meth-
od of bounds with maximum likelihood estimates. 
Table 1 provides a brief overview of the model and technique used to 
derive our estimates. According to Table 1, we can take advantage of the 
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only observable data that we have, those data in the marginal cells, and 
work our way back to those unobservable quantities within the body of 
the table. Based on Table 1, Xi represents the fraction of the voting age 
population who are black and Ti represents the proportion of the voting 
age population who voted for Johnson. The unobservable quantities of in-
terest are Bi
b, the proportion of blacks who voted for Johnson, and Bi
w, the 
proportion of Whites who voted for Johnson. These two estimates are cal-
culated using the estimation procedure, EI, developed by King (1997).8 
The Failure of the Deracialization Strategy: The 1993 
Democratic Primary
Consistent with the work of McCormick and Jones (1993), this arti-
cle compares and contrasts the campaign style, issues, and mobilization 
tactics used by Johnson in both 1993 and 1997. Recall that in a dera-
cialized campaign, a black candidate attempts to project a nonthreatening 
style so that he/she does not alienate white voters. As the Executive Di-
rector for the Mississippi Institute for Small Towns, a nonprofit organi-
zation which has developed and implemented water, sewer, and housing 
projects for communities throughout Mississippi, a member of the Board 
of Directors of Union of Planters Bank of Central Mississippi, a mem-
ber of the State Tax Commission and a member of a multitude of oth-
er professional organizations and public commissions, Johnson portrayed 
himself as a professional. He did not have experience in the civil rights 
movement, and did not engage in the “confrontational mold of the tradi-
tional black politician” (Llorens, Parsons, and Perry 1996, 112). 
Johnson adopted a campaign style that intended to be nonthreat-
ening to whites during his 1993 campaign. He was very careful about 
which blacks he aligned himself with. A case in point was his decision 
not to participate in the Grassroots Political Convention. In 1992 the 
Citywide Coalition for a Progressive Jackson (CCPJ), an organization 
that was created for the sole purpose of reducing to one the number of 
black candidates running in the Democratic primary for mayor, spon-
sored the Grassroots Political Convention. The convention was to be a 
medium through which a choice of a black mayoral candidate could be 
reached. In the view of the convention’s organizer, Ali Shamsid-Deen, 
the formation of this coalition spawned from a need to elect a candidate 
who would “place a priority on the problems currently destroying the 
African-American community” (cited in Stringfellow 1992, 1A). Sham-
sid-Deen has pointed to the successful employment of the People’s Con-
vention to elect Willie Herenton as the first black mayor of Memphis 
in 1991 as a “turning point” for his decision to initiate the organization 
(Pohlman and Kirby 1996, chapter 7; Uthoff 1992, A1). The most im-
mediate impetus that drove Shamsid-Deen’s decision, however, was the 
dissatisfaction within the black community over the white incumbent 
mayor’s (Kane Ditto) firing of David Walker, the city’s first black Po-
lice Chief (Shamsid-Deen 1999a, personal interview, March 18; Uthoff 
1992, B1). The CCPJ unsuccessfully lobbied to have Walker reinstat-
ed (Uthoff 1992, 1A). According to Shamsid-Deen (1999a), Walker was 
perceived by the black community as having had a major impact on the 
reduction of drug trafficking in the city, and therefore blacks were very 
dissatisfied with the mayor’s decision. Again, the coalition’s strategy to 
hold a convention was based on a similar strategy employed by black 
residents in Memphis in their efforts to elect a black mayor in 1991. In 
fact, some members of the Memphis coalition assisted in organizing the 
Jackson convention (Shamsid-Deen 1999a; see Uthoff 1992, B1). 
The “black-only” nature of the meeting left some blacks feeling un-
comfortable. Following criticism from the media for not allowing white 
residents to attend its meetings, The Clarion Ledger reported that the 
CCPJ expanded to include whites and went on to say that four whites at-
tended a meeting sponsored by the CCPJ, held on May 9, 1992 (Howard 
1993, A1). Further, the headline of a May 19, 1992, article by The Clari-
on Ledger, read: “Coalition open to whites living in black areas” (Camp-
bell 1992, A1). 
The Grassroots Political Convention was advertised in the Jack-
son Advocate, the city’s largest black newspaper, and The Clarion Led-
ger ran a number of stories prior to it. No official invitations were sent 
out. The convention was convened at 10:00 a.m. on August 29, 1992, at 
the Masonic Temple, located at 1072 Lynch Street, Jackson, Mississip-
pi. While both Shamsid-Deen and Henry Kirksey, the candidate who re-
ceived the endorsement of the convention, indicate that no whites at-
tended the convention (Kirksey 1999; Shamsid-Deen 1999b), The Clari-
on Ledger reported that “a handful” of whites were in attendance (Aden 
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1992, A1). The activities sponsored at the convention included voter reg-
istration, fund-raising, speeches, and the nominations. Only registered 
voters were allowed to participate in the nominating and voting process-
es. Those not registered, however, were allowed to fill out registration 
forms on-site. Approximately 200 people participated in the nominat-
ing and balloting process (Aden 1992, A1). Credell Calhoun, a candidate 
in the 1989 mayoral race and a former state representative, and Henry 
Kirksey, a noted civil rights activist, a former state senator and a candi-
date for mayor in 1981 and 1985, were the only people nominated. Af-
ter the nominations, members of the CCPJ were given the opportunity to 
vote between the two candidates. Kirksey emerged as the victor, receiv-
ing 68 percent of the votes. 
Johnson opted not to participate in the convention. According to 
Shamsid-Deen, who was responsible for contacting potential nominees, 
Johnson told him that if he participated in the convention “he would not 
be able to get the support of the white community and that they [CCPJ] 
were announcing their candidate too soon” (Shamsid-Deen 1999a). As-
suming that he would emerge as the winner, Johnson stated that “[h]e 
would be exposed to the white media too long”. The Clarion Ledger also 
reports that Johnson “found it more advantageous to stay out” (Fisher 
1997, A19) of the convention. In a separate article in The Clarion Led-
ger, Johnson stated, “I think it’s important to have a mayor who is sensi-
tive to the needs and interests of all the parts of this city” (cited in Camp-
bell 1992, A1), when responding to a question regarding him not partici-
pating in the convention. 
According to Charles Tisdale (1999), the editor of the Jackson Advo-
cate, following the convention’s election of Henry Kirksey, some black 
leaders personally asked Johnson not to enter the mayor’s race. Johnson 
ignored the plea of these leaders and announced his candidacy for may-
or on October 27, 1992. 
While the above evidence supports the notion that Johnson adopted a 
campaign style in 1993 intended to be nonthreatening to whites, other el-
ements considered critical to a deracialized strategy need to be examined 
as well. In a deracialized campaign the candidate seeks to downplay is-
sues that are racially divisive and emphasize issues that are “racially tran-
scendent.” In the 1993 campaign, Johnson ran on the issues of crime, eco-
nomic development, and race relations (Johnson 1998). Johnson’s focus 
on crime and economic development can be categorized as racially tran-
scendent (see e.g., Lorens, Parsons, and Perry 1996, 111). 
Jones and Clemons (1993, 76) state that candidates who run deracial-
ized campaigns should avoid using “direct racial appeals” in their efforts 
to organize the black community. In applying a deracialization strategy, 
Johnson’s campaign in 1993 failed to employ a strong mobilization strat-
egy for blacks. According to Jackson State University professor, Mary 
Coleman, “[t]he campaign for Johnson is a week late on everything . . . 
Some would say a year late” (cited in Howard 1993, A1). Indeed, because 
of limited resources, Johnson did not begin running television advertise-
ments until the week of the election. Due to the lack of resources, he also 
was unable to print any push cards, and he was only able to have a small 
number of placards printed in 1993. Johnson’s mobilization strategy relied 
mainly on his visits to black churches, a strategy that has been classified 
as deracialized (see Jones and Clemons 1993, 141). Jones and Clemons 
contend that this is a “low-visibility” strategy that is “less threatening to 
the white electorate,” compared to a strategy that would seek to publicly 
mobilize blacks (141). 
Racial Voting in the 1993 Democratic Primary for Mayor 
In 1993, six candidates entered the race for mayor of Jackson. They includ-
ed five Democrats and one Republican. Among the five Democrats were 
two whites and three African Americans. The two white Democratic can-
didates were the incumbent mayor, Kane Ditto, and a former, three-term 
mayor who held that office from 1977 to 1989, Dale Danks. The three Af-
rican-American Democratic candidates were former state Senator and not-
ed civil rights activist, Henry Kirksey, an urban planner and Executive Di-
rector of the Mississippi Institute for Small Towns, Harvey Johnson, and a 
Jackson State University undergraduate student, Courtney Paige. The lone 
Republican candidate in the election was Al Roland, a gas station atten-
dant. The Democratic primary was a close contest between Ditto, Danks, 
and Johnson.9 Ditto finished with 34 percent of the vote, Danks with 32 per-
cent, and Johnson with 24 percent. Kirksey received only nine percent of 
the vote, and Paige roughly one percent. Ditto and Danks were forced into 
a runoff. Ditto won the runoff, receiving 62 percent of the vote to Danks’s 
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38 percent. In the general election Ditto won by a landslide, receiving 85 
percent of the vote. 
According to the results in Table 2, the black vote was divided among 
four candidates during the 1993 Democratic primary. Johnson (African 
American) received the highest percentage, 46, followed by the incum-
bent, Kane Ditto (white), with 25 percent, Kirksey (African American) 
with 19 percent, and Dale Danks (white), a former mayor, with only 9 per-
cent. Paige (African American), a college student, received virtually no 
black or white support. 
Whites provided roughly 92 percent of their vote to the white candi-
dates and approximately only eight percent to the black candidates. The 
preferred candidate of the white community was the former mayor, Danks, 
who garnered 51 percent of the white vote, while the incumbent mayor, 
Ditto, finished second among white voters with 41 percent, followed by 
Johnson with seven percent and Kirksey with one percent. 
A Race-Specific Campaign: The 1997 Democratic Primary
Johnson cites his campaign experience in 1993 as the basis for his 
victory in 1997 (see Fisher 1997, A19). For Johnson, “[y]ou learn from 
your mistakes” (cited in Fisher 1997, A19). As stated above, one of John-
son’s most critical mistakes in the 1993 campaign was that he neglected 
the black vote in an effort to attract white crossover votes. To remedy this 
problem (neglect of the black vote), Johnson states that in 1997 he “went 
early at the black vote” (Johnson 1998). He contends that in 1997 he 
“made a conscious effort to get the black vote.” Johnson began his cam-
paign a year prior to the 1997 Democratic primary for mayor. His strat-
egy consisted of walking every block of the city to solicit the support of 
voters. In Johnson’s view, the emphasis in 1997 was on attracting a black 
base. Glenda Glover, a member of Johnson’s strategy team, indicates that 
Johnson’s skills as an urban planner were invaluable in his daily task of 
walking the streets (Glover 1999). 
Johnson did not attempt to run two separate campaigns, one for blacks 
and one for whites. One white political observer, Rims Barber, Executive 
Director of Mississippi Human Services Agenda, a research and advoca-
cy organization on behalf of the poor, stated in a personal interview that 
when Johnson visited the Belhaven community, a prominent white neigh-
borhood, “[h]e did not tilt his hat . . . and he also stated that it was not 
true that he was going to provide a gate around the community to pro-
tect them from crime” (Barber 1999). In an interview with The Clarion 
Ledger, Johnson said, “I wouldn’t allow my opponents to make me run 
away from the fact that I was black, to run away from the fact that people, 
black people in particular, would take pride in electing the first black may-
or of this city” (cited in Fisher 1997 A1, A19). Johnson pointed out that it 
would have been easy and dishonest of him to say what others have said 
to him, “[w]hen I look at people I don’t see race” (cited in Fisher 1997, 
19A). Johnson continued, “[i]n America in 1997, I just don’t think that’s 
the case. I think we do see race. And I have to admit that and move from 
there” (cited in Fisher 1997, 19A). In suggesting that Johnson ran a race-
specific campaign, local radio talk show host Frank Bluntson stated that 
Johnson was “blacker” in 1997 than in 1993 (Bluntson 1999). Additional 
evidence supporting the notion that Johnson ran a race-specific campaign 
is provided in an editorial taken from The Clarion Ledger the day after the 
1997 primary. “The racial aspect of the mayor’s race cannot be ignored . . 
. Johnson targeted the black community. Racially polarized voting is a po-
litical reality. His campaign recognized that and played to it” (The Clari-
on Ledger 1992, A8). Matt Friedman, a columnist for The Clarion Ledger, 
writes in an oped piece concerning Johnson, “[y]ou played the race card 
pretty significantly to win the election” (Friedman 1997, A13). 
Johnson also was able to gain the support of some of the major black 
leaders in the black community who had not supported him in 1993. He 
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was able to “forge a truce with Tisdale,” and therefore eliminated nega-
tive coverage in the Jackson Advocate, as he had received in 1993 and at 
the beginning of the 1997 campaign. Moreover, there were paid adver-
tisements for Johnson in the Jackson Advocate in 1997. The advertise-
ments contained race-specific information. For example, in an advertise-
ment printed in the April 17-23, 1997 edition, it was indicated that John-
son would “create a strong African American business community.” More 
importantly, at the very bottom of the advertisement in larger bold font, 
it read, “Because It’s Time for Jackson to Elect Its First African Ameri-
can Mayor!” In addition to the support of Tisdale, Johnson also received 
the support of Congressman Bennie Thompson, a well-respected politi-
cian and long-time civil rights activist. 
Thompson’s endorsement played a major role in Johnson’s ability 
to attract black voters. Thompson, however, was not easily persuaded to 
support Johnson. Charlie Horn, a staff member for Thompson, stated that 
the Congressman initially held reservations about supporting Johnson. 
Horn mentioned during a personal interview in April 1999 that Thompson 
thought Johnson was a “weak candidate” and that his “message was one 
that was compromising . . . one that catered more to the affluent commu-
nity . . . and one that was less attractive to people who needed a voice in 
government.” Thompson also felt that Johnson was “trying to attract white 
supporters” and was therefore neglecting a large portion of the black com-
munity (Horn 1999). Theoretically, Johnson’s strategy did not comport 
with the mobilization strategies traditionally adopted by blacks (see e.g., 
Morris 1975; Morrison 1987). 
After strong consideration, Thompson allowed Horn, one of his 
most skillful staff workers, to join Johnson’s campaign (Horn 1999). 
Horn was appointed to head the get-out-the-vote effort. Upon Horn’s ar-
rival, he found “no campaign strategy or structure” in place. As a former 
labor organizer for the A. Phillip Randolph Institute, Horn quickly be-
gan organizing the campaign. Horn’s first goal was to “increase turnout 
in 59 overwhelmingly black precincts.” In an effort to achieve this goal, 
Horn began a “canvassing or literature drop” campaign to increase John-
son’s name recognition. This process entailed a door-to-door distribu-
tion of campaign literature. It also included days in which volunteers oc-
cupied street corners and waved Harvey Johnson campaign signs. Horn 
then met with Johnson to suggest that he craft a message that would con-
nect with those voters who had been left out of the political and econom-
ic process. Horn advised Johnson to take on the aura of a Baptist preach-
er, and told him that his message had to “come from the gut,” that blacks 
had to perceive him as sincere. Horn stated, “you got to connect with 
Aint Be′ Ruth Chill’un,” which translates into “you have got to connect 
with Aunt Baby Ruth’s children.” In other words, Horn’s advice to John-
son was that he needed to craft his message to reach beyond the black 
middle class. 
The strategy worked! While observing one of Johnson’s speech-
es late in the campaign for the primary, Barber (1999) reports he was 
amazed that Johnson had the crowd “stirring.” Barber said he had nev-
er seen Johnson stir-up a crowd before. Horn confirms Barber’s story. 
He asserts that Johnson created such a high level of excitement that so 
many volunteers turned out to help with the campaign that some of them 
had to be turned away (Horn 1999). 
The excitement created by Johnson’s speeches created a movement 
within the black community. Indeed, Johnson claimed that this was all a 
part of the strategy, to “create a movement, a crusade-type environment” 
(cited in Fisher 1997, A19). When speaking to black audiences, Johnson 
did not invoke a militant style, but he did say that “[i]t’s time! Its [sic] 
time for African American leadership to come to the forefront” (Johnson 
1998). Similarly, when speaking to majority white audiences, Johnson 
would indicate at the outset of his speech that he was “a black man that 
wants to be mayor of this city, and if elected will still be a black man, but 
that did not mean that I could not govern the city better than a white man” 
(Johnson 1998). In Johnson’s opinion, “whites who were offended, were 
not going to support him anyway” (Johnson 1998). 
In his effort to galvanize the black community, Johnson would tell a 
story of an elderly black woman who was barely getting along, and whom 
he had asked to vote for him. The woman’s response was “Baby don’t 
worry! I may not see me a black president but I’m going to see me a black 
mayor!” On many occasions he would tell a story about “the foxes and the 
hounds . . . if the hounds could outnumber the foxes then they could de-
feat the foxes.” Additionally, he related a tale about “the rabbits and the 
hound, even the lowly rabbit, if it gets itself together, then it could beat 
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out the hound.” He spoke of “black rabbits and white rabbits, rabbits in 
South Jackson and North Jackson.” Finally, while Johnson admits that he 
employed a different campaign strategy in 1997, he contends that the is-
sues did not change, (i.e., crime, economic development, and race rela-
tions). The presentation of these issues, however, did change, as a result of 
the change in Johnson’s style. These changes no doubt improved his sup-
port among black voters. In 1997, Table 3 indicates that Johnson captured 
an estimated 77 percent of the black vote in contrast to only 46 percent in 
1993. While voter turnout among blacks actually decreased from an esti-
mated 45 percent in 1993 (see Table 2) to 26 percent in 1997, it is estimat-
ed that blacks constituted a substantial majority (65 percent) of those vot-
ing in the 1997 primary (compared to only 47 percent in 1993). 
Racial Voting in the 1997 Democratic Primary 
The 1997 mayoral campaign drew a crowded field of twelve candi-
dates. This pool of candidates was comprised of six Democrats, four Re-
publicans, and two independents. The field was evenly split along racial 
lines, six whites and six African Americans. Among the Democrats, three 
were white and three were African American. The white Democrats in-
cluded the incumbent mayor, Ditto, an attorney, Pat Frascogna, and a re-
tired attorney, Lewis Wilson. The African American Democrats were 
Johnson, plus a state legislator, Mary Coleman, and a truck driver, Charles 
Taylor. Of the four Republicans, only one was African American, James 
Meredith, a civil rights activist and most notably, the first African Ameri-
can student admitted to the University of Mississippi. The three white Re-
publicans included an insurance salesman, Aaron Dupuy III, the co-owner 
of A-1 Pallet, Charlotte Reeves, and, once again, Al Roland, now a driver 
for Mississippi Seafood Exchange. The two independent candidates were 
African American: a teacher, urban planner, and 1996 Democratic con-
gressional candidate Kevin Antoine, and Ivory Phillips, a Jackson State 
University Professor. 
As indicated by Table 3, Johnson’s (African American) percent-
age of the black vote in the 1997 primary is estimated to have been 77, 
which is 31 percentage points higher than that estimate for 1993. Johnson 
was followed by Ditto (white), with nine percent of the black vote, Mary 
Coleman (African American; not to be confused with the Professor cited 
above), a state legislator, with seven percent, Pat Frascogna (white), an at-
torney with four and Charles Taylor (African American), a truck driver, 
with two. Lewis Wilson (white), an attorney, is estimated to have received 
approximately one percent of the black vote. 
Johnson’s victory was boosted by the 19 percent of the white vote that 
he is estimated to have received, an increase of 12 percentage points over 
that estimate for the 1993 primary. The candidate of choice for white vot-
ers was the incumbent mayor Ditto, who received an estimated 52 percent 
of their votes. Frascogna received the second highest white vote, with 24 
percent, followed by Coleman with four percent. Both Wilson and Taylor 
received virtually no white support. 
The General Election
Johnson faced Charlotte Reeves, the winner of the Republican prima-
ry, in the 1997 general election. Reeves, a white businesswoman with no 
prior political experience, won the Republican primary easily, with 70 per-
cent of the vote. Johnson received the endorsements of former mayor Kane 
Ditto and Kevin Antoine, a former mayoral candidate, and also those of 
The Clarion Ledger and the Jackson Advocate, neither of which had en-
dorsed him in 1993. Reeves was endorsed by Pat Frascogna, a candidate 
in the Democratic primary, and Governor Kirk Fordice, a Republican. Re-
gardless of who would emerge as the winner of the general election, histo-
ry was to be made in Jackson. Either the first African American, or the first 
woman, would be elected mayor. In the end, Johnson prevailed, receiving 
70 percent of the overall vote (30,310 to 13,282). 
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Racially Polarized Voting in the 1997 General Election 
Blacks overwhelmingly supported Johnson in the 1997 general elec-
tion by casting an estimated 98 percent of their votes for him; Reeves re-
ceived only two percent. Whites, on the other hand, preferred Reeves. 
But whites were more willing to cross over in the general election than 
they had done in either the 1993 or 1997 Democratic primaries, providing 
Johnson with 35 percent of their votes. 
Conclusion
In 1997, Harvey Johnson became the first African American to be 
elected as mayor in Jackson, Mississippi. Johnson’s victory made nation-
al news, given the state’s infamous history in the area of race relations and 
its virulent opposition to the civil rights movement. The day after John-
son’s victory, The Clarion Ledger ran a story implying that he had run a 
deracialized campaign in 1993 and lost, then ran a racialized campaign 
in 1997 and won. The primary purpose of this article was to test this con-
tention. Indeed, Johnson’s (1997) style and mobilization tactics contrast-
ed sharply with those in 1993. In addition, while the issues were the same 
for both elections, his presentation of them was different. Johnson spoke 
to the issues in a way that was more appealing to the entire black commu-
nity in 1997. He also did not attempt to send mixed messages to the black 
and white communities. When it came down to the issues, what was said 
in the black community was also said in the white community. While I 
was not able to obtain copies of Johnson’s speeches, which would have 
enabled me to make quantitative comparisons of the use of racial cues in 
those speeches, the qualitative evidence presented in this article clearly 
shows that Johnson ran a more race-specific campaign in 1997 compared 
to 1993. In particular, Johnson’s style was different in that he confronted 
the issue of race and his mobilization tactics were more aggressively tar-
geted to the black community. 
One of the weaknesses associated with studies examining the dera-
cialization construct is that this body of research fails to take into consid-
eration contextual effects such as the media or the campaigns run by oth-
er black candidates. In 1993, Johnson was hurt by his failure to participate 
in a community-based campaign for the election of a black mayor. John-
son’s decision not to participate in the CCPJ played a major role in his de-
feat in the 1993 primaries. Whether it was simply the case that Johnson 
was unable to capture the vote of those mainly black citizens who sup-
ported the coalition, or the fact that the emerging candidate from the Co-
alition, Henry Kirksey, was able to fracture the black vote, Johnson was 
hurt by his lack of participation. This event was probably more important 
in 1993 than in 1997 primarily because of the racial demographics of the 
city in 1993. The 1990 census suggests that the black population was ap-
proximately 56 percent, while the 2000 Census puts the black population 
at approximately 71 percent. To be sure, the campaign styles adopted by 
Johnson played key roles in his defeat and victory in 1993 and 1997, re-
spectively. However, it clearly was not the sole variable explaining these 
two outcomes. Kirksey’s pro-black agenda surely siphoned off some of 
the black votes, as is indicated by the findings reported here, and white 
flight was clearly a factor in 1997. 
In closing, the deracialized tactics employed by Johnson in 1993 pro-
duced minimal support from Whites, while gaining Johnson less than half 
the votes cast by blacks. These findings run counter to those previously 
reported in studies of deracialized campaigns that demonstrate that black 
candidates who have adopted this strategy have been successful (see e.g., 
Jones and Clemons 1993; Llorens, Parsons, and Perry 1996; Schexnider 
1990; Winn and Palmer 1996). 
Notes
1 The author would like to thank Richard L. Engstrom, Sharon Wright-Austin, Robert Albrit-
ton, L. Judson Jeffries, Neal Allen, Christopher Lawrence, and the anonymous peer reviewers. 
The author would especially like to thank his father, the late Dan Orey, Jr. for his inspiration and 
guidance. This project was funded by the Southern Regional Education Board Doctoral Scholars 
Program and the Earnest G. Chachere Fellowship at the University of New Orleans. The author 
retains responsibility for errors within the manuscript. 
2 The black population was 56 percent according to the 1990 census. 
3 It should also be noted that Wright-Austin and Middleton (2004) have also applied the dera-
cialization construct to Latino campaigns. 
4 The Church’s long-standing political role stretched back into slavery, when it had constituted 
the only institution to which blacks could turn. After blacks migrated north to the big cities, the 
church’s political role became all the more pronounced (Frazier 1964, 169). 
5 A large portion of Bennie Thompson’s district overlapped with the city of Jackson. Hence, 
Thompson’s racialized campaign helps to buttress my argument discounting the usefulness of a 
deracialized campaign in Jackson, Mississippi. 
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6 This new method developed by King replaces the previous reliance on ecological regression 
to create such estimates, and now serves as the leading method for ecological inference in the so-
cial sciences. 
7 King’s method makes three assumptions: (1) that each precinct’s black and white percentag-
es together are one drawn from bivariate normal distribution, truncated so that both fall within the 
0 percent and 100 percent range; (2) in each precinct, the estimated black vote ( Bi
b) and the esti-
mated white vote ( Bi
w) are mean independent of racial density; and (3) that the values of the pro-
portion voting (Ti) “in different precincts are independent after conditioning on Xi” (King 1997, 
94). 
8 The current analysis employed EI, version 1.9 (Benoit and King 2000), available online at 
http://gking.harvard.edu 
9 The primary system in Jackson is an open-system in which the voter chooses which party 
primary (i.e., Democratic or Republican) he/she wants to vote in on Election Day. 
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